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Number 2004/08   December 2004 
SERVICE OF PROCESS AND THE MILITARY 
? W. Mark C. Weidemaier 
This bulletin addresses service of process on members of the United States Armed Forces and 
civilians located on military property.  Absent service of process, of course, or a statutory 
exemption to service, the court lacks jurisdiction to enter a judgment against the defendant.1  
But while fairly routine in most cases, service may be complicated by a defendant’s presence 
on a U.S. military installation, on a military ship in U.S. or foreign waters, or on a base in a 
foreign country. 
Consider a lawsuit against a servicemember who recently has been mobilized for duty 
and who is currently undergoing in-processing at Fort Bragg before deployment overseas.  
May the sheriff leave a copy of the summons and complaint with the defendant’s spouse or 
partner at the defendant’s former civilian address?  If not, and the plaintiff must serve the 
defendant at Fort Bragg or, worse, at a duty station overseas, what methods of service are 
available? 
This dilemma is not an uncommon one, as members of the Armed Forces may become 
involved in litigation to the same extent as civilians.  In 2001, for example, the Army Legal 
Assistance Offices reportedly assisted more than 29,000 servicemembers with divorce-related 
issues.2  Litigation involving servicemembers, of course, is not limited to domestic law
                                                          
1. See, e.g., G.S. § 1-75.3; Freeman v. Freeman, 155 N.C. App. 603, 606, 573 S.E.2d 708, 711 
(2002) (noting need to obtain jurisdiction by service or by method prescribed by statute); First Union 
Nat’l Bank v. Rolfe, 83 N.C. App. 625, 628, 351 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1986) (noting constitutional 
“mandate[] that a party be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before he can be deprived of a 
legal claim or defense”). 
2.  See Maj. Wendy P. Daknis, Home Sweet Home:  A Practical Approach to Domicile, 177 Mil. 
L. Rev. 49, 62 n.75 (2003); see also Maj. Alan L. Cook, The Armed Forces as a Model Employer in 
Child Support Enforcement:  A Proposal to Improve Service of Process on Military Members, 155 Mil. 
L. Rev. 153, 153-54 & nn. 4-6 (1998) (noting varying estimates that the federal government, and 
primarily the Department of Defense, employed up to 100,000 parents who were in arrears on child 
support obligations). 
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matters.3  Moreover, servicemembers’ family members 
and dependents, as well as civilian employees, may 
work or live on military installations and become 
involved with the court system.  This bulletin will refer 
to all such persons as “servicemembers” or “members 
of the Armed Forces,” except where there is reason to 
distinguish between servicemembers and civilians. 
The methods a plaintiff may use to serve a 
member of the Armed Forces vary depending on a 
number of factors.  These factors include, among 
others, the location of the relevant military installation; 
the location of the court that issued the service papers; 
the nature of federal jurisdiction over the installation; 
any unique policies implemented by the relevant 
branch of service; and, if the servicemember is 
stationed overseas, the effect of any applicable 
international law and agreements, such as the 
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial 
Matters, also known as the Hague Convention.4 
This bulletin provides an overview of service of 
state court process on members of the Armed Forces.  
It focuses on litigation involving servicemembers in 
their individual capacities, rather than litigation 
resulting from the exercise of official duties or lawsuits 
purporting to name the United States or a specific 
branch of the military as a defendant.5  Nor does the 
bulletin address the separate, and often complex, 
question of whether a state may enforce its laws with 
                                                          
3.  See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Horak, 325 N.W.2d 
134 (Minn. 1982) (suit against servicemember located in 
West Germany based on alleged illegal purchase and supply 
of liquor to minor involved in accident). 
4.  See Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial 
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial 
Matters, Done at the Hague November 15, 1965 (entered into 
force for the United States February 10, 1969), 20 U.S.T. 
361; T.I.A.S. 6638; 658 U.N.T.S. 163; 28 U.S.C. (Appendix 
following Fed. R. Civ. P. 4). 
5.  See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 516.10(a) (establishing 
policy that Department of the Army “officials will not 
prevent or evade the service of process in legal actions 
brought against the United States or against themselves in 
their official capacities”); 32 C.F.R. § 516.14 (“The Chief, 
Litigation Division, shall accept service of process for 
Department of the Army or for the Secretary of the Army in 
his official capacity.”). 
respect to conduct occurring on a military installation.6  
Moreover, although the bulletin discusses service of 
process on members of the Armed Forces located 
outside the United States, readers interested in a more 
thorough discussion of international service should 
review Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2004/07, 
International Service of Process Under the Hague 
Convention (2004).7 
General rules governing service of 
process on members of the Armed 
Forces 
The rules governing service of process on civilian 
litigants apply to members of the Armed Forces as 
well.8  Any difficulty in accomplishing service, 
therefore, arises not from the fact that the defendant is 
a servicemember but from the control exercised by the 
federal government over military installations.  So, for 
example, an off-base servicemember is subject to 
personal service to the same extent as any other 
litigant.9 
                                                          
6.  That issue is beyond the scope of this bulletin but 
generally depends on the nature of the federal government’s 
legislative jurisdiction over the land in question.  See, e.g., 
State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 161, 400 S.E.2d 405 (1991) (holding 
that Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to try defendant as an 
adult for crimes allegedly committed as a juvenile on the 
Camp Lejeune military installation).  For a brief discussion 
of federal jurisdiction over property acquired from states, see 
note 36, infra. 
7.  This bulletin also does not address the effect of the 
Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 501 et 
seq., which provides, among other things, for temporary 
stays of judicial and administrative proceedings against 
servicemembers on active duty.  The Act does not affect the 
manner in which members of the Armed Forces must be 
served with process.  See, e.g., Greco v. Renegades, Inc., 761 
N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); McFadden v. 
Shore, 60 F. Supp. 8, 9 (E.D. Pa. 1945). 
8.  No provision of N.C.R.C.P. 4 distinguishes 
between service on civilian litigants and members of the 
Armed Forces. 
9.  See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(1)a; see also In re 
Custody of Nugent, 955 P.2d 584, 586-87 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1997) (holding that defendant had been properly served in 
dissolution of marriage/custody action in Colorado when, 
after repeated, failed attempts at service on military base in 
Connecticut, defendant was personally served on visit to 
Colorado).  Likewise, in some, limited circumstances, a 
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Because members of the Armed Forces must be 
served in the same manner as any other party, the 
question arises whether they are subject to substituted 
personal service at a former civilian residence.  This 
bulletin first addresses this question before turning to 
the mechanics of serving process on military property. 
Substituted personal service on members 
of the Armed Forces 
North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(1)a 
authorizes service by “leaving copies [of the summons 
and complaint] at the defendant's dwelling house or 
usual place of abode with some person of suitable age 
and discretion then residing therein.”10  Does this rule 
authorize the sheriff to leave service papers with 
someone at the servicemember’s civilian residence, 
even though the servicemember now resides on a 
military installation in the U.S. or abroad?11   
The answer depends on whether the terms 
“dwelling house” and “usual place of abode” in Rule 
4(j)(1) refer to the servicemember’s domicile or, more 
broadly, to his or her residence.  The term “[r]esidence 
simply indicates a person’s actual place of abode, 
whether permanent or temporary.”12  “Domicile,” by 
                                                                                         
member of the Armed Forces might be subject to service by 
publication.  See G.S. §1A-1, Rule 4(j1) (authorizing such 
service when a party “cannot with due diligence be served by 
personal delivery, registered or certified mail, or by a 
designated delivery service”). 
10.  G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(1)a.  The “person of suitable 
age and discretion” must reside at the defendant’s “dwelling 
house” or “usual place of abode” at the time the summons 
and complaint are delivered.  See Guthrie v. Ray, 293 N.C. 
67, 70, 235 S.E.2d 146, 148 (1977). 
11.  If Rule 4(j)(1)a authorizes this manner of service, 
and if it is consistent with due process (a topic discussed 
briefly below), substituted personal service might be 
available even if the servicemember was stationed overseas.  
See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 
694, 700 (1988) (holding that forum law determines whether 
service on a party located overseas requires the “transmittal” 
of documents abroad and is thus subject to the Hague 
Convention). 
12.  Hall v. Wake County Bd. of Elections, 280 N.C. 
600, 606, 187 S.E.2d 52, 55 (1972); see also BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1310 (8th ed. 2004) (listing, among definitions 
of residence, “[t]he place where one actually lives” and “[a] 
house or other fixed abode; a dwelling”). 
contrast, refers to “a person’s true, fixed, principal, and 
permanent home, to which that person intends to return 
and remain even though currently residing 
elsewhere.”13  An adult establishes a domicile by being 
physically present in a place he or she intends to 
remain,14 and may retain that domicile even when 
residing elsewhere: 
To effect a change of domicile, there must be 
an actual abandonment of the first domicile, 
coupled with an intention not to return to it, 
and there must be a new domicile acquired by 
actual residence within another jurisdiction, 
coupled with the intention of making the last-
acquired residence a permanent home.15 
A number of courts have interpreted “usual place 
of abode,” “dwelling house,” or similar terms to mean 
something akin to “domicile.”16  Under such an 
interpretation, after a servicemember establishes a 
domicile at a civilian residence, he or she may be 
served there after being called to duty unless the 
evidence shows a change of domicile – i.e., that the 
servicemember did not intend to return and intended to 
make a permanent home in his or her new place of 
residence. 
A greater number of courts, however, interpret the 
terms “usual place of abode” and “dwelling house” by 
engaging in “a practical inquiry as to where the 
defendant is actually living.”17  These courts construe 
                                                          
13.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 501 (8th ed. 2004). 
14.  See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. 
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989); Hall, 280 N.C. at 605-06, 
187 S.E.2d at 55 (“Two things must concur to constitute a 
domicile:  First, residence; second, the intent to make the 
place of residence a home.”). 
15.  Reynolds v. Lloyd Cotton Mills, 177 N.C. 412, 99 
S.E. 240, 245 (1919). 
16.  See, e.g., McFadden v Shore, 60 F Supp 8, 9 (E.D. 
Pa. 1945); Ruth & Clark, Inc. v Emery, 11 N.W.2d 397, 401 
(Iowa 1943) (interpreting term “usual place of residence”). 
17.  Hysell v Murray, 28 F.R.D. 584, 588 (S.D. Iowa, 
1961).  These courts recognize that “[s]ervice with our armed 
forces frequently results in a somewhat nomadic existence . . 
. . Assignment to a station, camp or ship compels the 
physical presence of military personnel at spots all over the 
country, even the world, for fixed periods but does not 
necessarily result in a change of their domicile.”  King v. 
Fisher, 117 A.2d 76, 77 (Del. Super. 1955). 
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“usual place of abode” to mean “the place where a 
person is physically residing for other than the narrow, 
limited purpose of a vacation or other short, temporary 
absence. . . . [I]t must be the place where the defendant 
is usually to be found.”18  Accordingly, a 
servicemember’s usual place of abode is “the military 
installation where he is stationed, regardless of 
whether he is married or intends to return to his former 
residence at the conclusion of military service.”19  
Unless it appears that the servicemember is only 
temporarily absent from the civilian residence and is 
actually likely to receive papers delivered there, these 
courts require service to be made where the 
servicemember actually resides.20 
Rather than attempt precise definition, North 
Carolina courts have analyzed whether a place is a 
party’s dwelling house or usual place of abode “on the 
facts of the particular case.”21  Their analysis has 
yielded a definition that is “probably broad enough to 
embrace any location inhabited by [the] defendant with 
such frequency that his absence therefrom is only 
temporary.”22  But the cases do not support the view 
that a defendant’s “dwelling house” or “usual place of 
abode” will always include the defendant’s domicile.  
The fact that a servicemember remains domiciled at his 
or her civilian residence, therefore, does not mean that 
substituted service may always be made at that 
address.  Rather, as the following cases suggest, 
substituted service will likely be valid only when made 
on a suitable person at a place from which the 
servicemember is only temporarily absent, and 
therefore under circumstances where it is reasonably 
                                                          
18.  Whetsel v. Gosnell, 181 A.2d 91, 94 (Del. 1962). 
19.  Id. 
20.  See, e.g., Neher v District Court for Fourth 
Judicial Dist., 422 P.2d 627, 628 (Colo. 1967); Whetsel v 
Gosnell, 181 A.2d 91, 94 (Del. 1962); Hysell, 28 F.R.D. at 
588; James v Russell F. Davis, Inc., 163 F Supp 253, 256-57 
(N.D. Ind. 1958); Booth v Crockett, 173 P.2d 647, 648-50 
(Utah 1946); Kurilla v Roth, 38 A.2d 862, 863 (N.J. 1944). 
21.  Van Buren v. Glasco,  27 N.C. App. 1, 5, 217 
S.E.2d 579, 582 (1975) (quotation omitted), overruled on 
other grounds by Love v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 291 S.E.2d 
141 (1982). 
22.  See G. Gray Wilson, North Carolina Civil 
Procedure § 4-13 (Michie, 2d ed. 1995).  Note, too, that a 
defendant may have more than one place of abode.  See 
Glasco, 27 N.C. App. at 6, 217 S.E.2d at 582. 
likely that the defendant will receive actual notice of 
the action. 
•  In Gibbey v. Lindsey, 149 N.C. App. 470, 
560 S.E.2d 589 (2002), the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the Superior Court’s refusal to set 
aside a default judgment entered against a 
defendant in a wrongful death case.  The 
sheriff had left a copy of the summons and 
complaint at the residence of defendant’s 
mother, with whom defendant had formerly 
lived.  The defendant had left his mother’s 
home several weeks previously to stay with 
relatives in South Carolina.  Nevertheless the 
Court of Appeals held that the defendant 
failed to present clear and unequivocal 
evidence of improper service, noting that the 
defendant left without telling his mother 
where he was going, left most of his 
possessions behind, considered his mother’s 
residence his “home,” and had no intention of 
staying in South Carolina “for any length of 
time.”  Id. at 473, 560 S.E.2d at 592.  The 
defendant’s mother also testified that, at the 
time of service, “her home was Defendant’s 
primary residence.”  Id. at 473, 560 S.E.2d at 
592.  
• In Van Buren v. Glasco,  27 N.C. App. 1, 217 
S.E.2d 579 (1975),23 the Court of Appeals 
again affirmed a Superior Court’s refusal to 
set aside a default judgment.  The sheriff had 
left a copy of the summons and complaint 
with the defendant’s fifteen year old son at a 
house in North Carolina owned jointly by the 
defendant and his wife.  Although the 
defendant had been working and living in 
South Carolina for more than a year – 
residing in another house owned jointly with 
his wife – the defendant’s wife and son lived 
at the North Carolina home, and defendant 
returned home from South Carolina on the 
“frequently recurring basis” of at least twice a 
month.  The Court of Appeals held that “when 
all of the circumstances are considered, 
[defendant’s] relationship and connection 
with the North Carolina dwelling were such 
that there was a reasonable probability that 
substitute service of process at that dwelling 
would, as it in fact here did, inform him of the 
                                                          
23.  Van Buren was overruled on other grounds by Love 
v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 291 S.E.2d 141 (1982). 
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proceedings against him in apt time to permit 
him to assert  in timely fashion such defenses 
as he might have.”  Id. at 6, 217 S.E.2d at 582 
(emphasis added).  In addition, the Court 
noted, but did not decide, that the defendant’s 
South Carolina residence might also qualify 
as a “dwelling house or usual place of abode.” 
• In Sink v. Easter, 284 N.C. 555, 202 S.E.2d 
138 (1974), the North Carolina Supreme 
Court held that a defendant who was 
temporarily out of the country was not subject 
to service of process by publication, because 
the plaintiff could have effected substituted 
service at the defendant’s North Carolina 
residence.  The sheriff had attempted to serve 
the defendant at his residence in Guilford 
County, but had returned the summons and 
complaint unserved with a notation indicating 
that the defendant was in Amsterdam at an 
unknown address.  The plaintiff’s attorney 
also submitted an affidavit stating that he had 
contacted someone at the defendant’s 
residence, who had not known how long the 
defendant would remain in Europe.  The 
defendant returned from Europe 
approximately one month later.  Without 
extensive discussion, the Court concluded that 
“plaintiff could have and therefore should 
have effected” substituted personal service.  
See id. at 141, 202 S.E.2d at 558.  There 
appeared to be no dispute, however, that the 
defendant in fact resided in North Carolina at 
the time of service and intended to return.24 
None of these cases involves service on a member 
of the Armed Forces residing on a military installation, 
                                                          
24.  See also Guthrie v. Ray, 293 N.C. 67, 71-73, 235 
S.E.2d 146, 149-50 (1977) (holding that trial court properly 
refused to set aside default judgment entered against 
defendant where sheriff’s return indicated that service had 
been made by leaving copy of summons and complaint with 
defendant’s mother at defendant’s and her dwelling house.  
Although defendant submitted affidavit stating that he had 
resided in another state for almost thirty years, Court applied 
the rule that a single affidavit is insufficient to overcome 
presumption of proper service afforded sheriff’s return.); 
Ryals v. Hall-Lane Moving and Storage Co., Inc., 122 N.C. 
App. 242, 246-47, 468 S.E.2d 600, 603-04 (1996) (affirming 
dismissal for lack of service where evidence showed that 
defendants “resided” at address other than that at which 
sheriff had left copy of summons and complaint). 
much less one deployed overseas.  They suggest, 
however, that substituted service at a civilian residence 
will be valid only if there is a reasonable probability 
that the defendant will receive actual and timely notice 
of the action.25  Such a rule is consistent with the 
purpose of the service requirement, which is “to 
provide the party with notice and allow him an 
opportunity to answer or plead otherwise.”26 
Returning, then, to the example used at the 
beginning of this bulletin – in which a recently-
mobilized defendant is stationed at Fort Bragg and 
awaiting deployment overseas – may the process 
server leave service papers with the defendant’s spouse 
or partner at the defendant’s former civilian residence?  
The North Carolina case law suggests that the answer 
is “no,” unless the defendant is only temporarily absent 
and is likely to receive actual notice of the action. 
Moreover, constitutional due process may also 
require the plaintiff to utilize another means of service.  
Due process entitles defendants to “notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 
[them] of the pendency of the action and afford them 
an opportunity to present their objections.”27  “The 
means employed must be such as one desirous of 
actually informing the absentee might reasonably 
adopt to accomplish it.”28  It is likely that substituted 
personal service at a civilian residence would fall short 
of this standard in at least some cases, particularly if 
the servicemember is deployed overseas or has 
minimal contact with the person to whom the 
summons and complaint are delivered. 
Whether a plaintiff’s chosen service method 
satisfies due process may also depend on whether the 
plaintiff neglected to use other methods that would 
have been more likely to provide actual and timely 
                                                          
25.  See Glasco, 27 N.C. App. at 6, 217 S.E.2d at 582. 
26.  State ex rel. Desselberg v. Peele, 136 N.C. App. 
206, 208, 523 S.E.2d 125, 127 (1999). 
27 . Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (holding also that “[t]he notice 
must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required 
information and it must afford a reasonable time for those 
interested to make their appearance”); see also McDonald’s 
Corp. v. Dwyer, 338 N.C. 445, 448, 450 S.E.2d 888, 891 
(1994) (noting same requirement under N.C. Constitution).   
28.  See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315. 
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notice.29  And with respect to members of the Armed 
Forces, substituted personal service will rarely be the 
only available service method.  Indeed, when 
compared to alternative service methods, substituted 
service will sometimes be a decidedly inferior method 
of providing notice.  The remainder of this bulletin 
discusses these alternative methods, under which 
plaintiffs may serve members of the Armed Forces on 
or off military reservations, including those outside the 
United States. 
Service of process on military 
installations 
Military authorities are not responsible for serving 
process on members of the armed forces or civilians 
working or residing on military installations.30  But 
authorities can sometimes facilitate service, for 
example by determining whether a servicemember will 
voluntarily accept service or, in some cases, by 
providing a location for the process server to wait and 
ordering the servicemember to that location.31  In fact, 
members of the Armed Forces may agree to accept 
service with some frequency, especially in cases 
involving child support or other family obligations.  
                                                          
29.  See id. (“The reasonableness and hence the 
constitutional validity of any chosen method may be 
defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain 
to inform those affected, or, where conditions do not 
reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not 
substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of 
the feasible and customary substitutes.”) (citations omitted); 
Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 454 (1982) (“Of course, the 
reasonableness of the notice provided must be tested with 
reference to the existence of "feasible and customary" 
alternatives and supplements to the form of notice chosen.”). 
30.  The military has been unwilling to serve process, 
in part due to a concern that providing such assistance to 
civil litigants would violate the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1385, which criminalizes “willfully us[ing] any part 
of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or 
otherwise to execute the laws.”  See Cook, supra note 2 at 
173 (noting historic concern of military that directly serving 
process for state courts would violate Act). 
31.  See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 516.10 (providing that Army 
officials asked to facilitate service of state process will 
determine whether the defendant wishes to accept service); 
32 C.F.R. § 720.20(a) (permitting Navy commanding 
officers to order servicemembers to accept service from 
courts located in the same state as the military installation).  
Military policy requires servicemembers to provide 
financial support to family members and to abide by 
court orders governing such matters.32 
If the plaintiff must formally serve a defendant on 
military property, military regulations and policies 
affect how, and whether, the plaintiff may do so.33  
The following sections discuss the impact of those 
policies on the service provisions of the North Carolina 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Service on military installations within the 
United States 
Rule 4(j)(1) authorizes litigants to use a number of 
service methods “within or without” North Carolina.34  
For purposes of this bulletin, the most relevant service 
methods are personal service (or substituted personal 
service as discussed above) and service by registered 
or certified mail, return receipt requested.35 
                                                          
32.  See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 584.2 (Army regulation 
requiring soldiers to provide financial support to family 
members and to obey court orders regarding child custody); 
32 C.F.R. § 733.3 (“All members of the naval service are 
expected to conduct their personal affairs satisfactorily. This 
includes the requirement that they provide adequate and 
continuous support for their lawful dependents and comply 
with the terms of separation agreements and court orders. 
Failure to do so which tends to bring discredit on the naval 
service is a proper subject of command consideration for 
initiation of court-martial proceedings or other administrative 
or disciplinary action.”). 
33.  Service of process on U.S. military bases and ships 
is governed by regulation.  See 32 C.F.R. § 516 (Army 
regulations); 32 C.F.R. § 720.20 (Navy and Marine Corps. 
regulations). 
34.  See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(1).  The rule governs 
service upon natural persons. 
35.  See id., Rule 4(j)(1)a & c.  Rule 4(j)(1)b allows 
delivery of the summons and complaint to an agent 
authorized to accept service on behalf of the defendant.  In 
the past, the Armed Forces have considered designating 
agents to receive service in child support cases on behalf of 
servicemembers stationed overseas.  See Exec. Order No. 
12,953, 60 Fed. Reg. 11,013 § 402(a)(iv) (1995); see also 
Cook, supra note 2 at 166-67 n. 94 & 205-211 (noting that 
the Department of Defense recommended against the 
designated agent proposal and evaluating due process 
implications of proposal).  To date, however, the Department 
December 2004 Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2004/08 
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Personal service on military installations 
Litigants may be able to have members of the 
Armed Forces personally served while on military 
property, although the procedures are somewhat more 
complicated than is the case off-base.  Whether the 
process server may gain access to the installation 
depends in part on the nature of federal jurisdiction 
over the property.  On occasion, federal jurisdiction 
may be exclusive to the point that state process may 
not be served on the installation.36  In such cases, 
military commanders will determine whether the 
defendant will accept service, but if he or she refuses 
to do so, the commander may deny the process server 
access to the installation.37 
In most cases, however, states reserve the right to 
serve civil and criminal process on land acquired by 
the federal government, and often reserve the right to 
                                                                                         
of Defense has declined to adopt this designated agent 
approach. 
36.  Article I, § 8, cl. 17 of the United States 
Constitution, permits Congress to “acquire derivative 
legislative power from a State . . . by consensual acquisition 
of land, or by nonconsensual acquisition followed by the 
State’s subsequent cession of legislative authority over the 
land.”  Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542, (1976).  
Federal jurisdiction over such property ranges from exclusive 
(with no state legislative power, and possibly no right to 
serve state process), to “concurrent, or partial, federal 
legislative jurisdiction, which may allow the State to exercise 
certain authority,” id., to mere proprietorial interests in the 
land.  See also G. Coggins & C. Wilkinson, FEDERAL PUBLIC 
LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 172 (1987).  In most cases, 
however, states reserve the right to serve process even in 
areas over which federal legislative jurisdiction is exclusive.  
See, e.g., Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 
533 (1885) (noting that such a reservation does not 
“interfere[e] . . . with the supremacy of the United States 
over [acquired lands], but . . . prevent[s] them from 
becoming an asylum for fugitives from justice”).   
37.  See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 516.10(d)(1) (Army 
regulation providing that, where servicemember will not 
accept service, “the party requesting service will be notified 
that the nature of the exclusive Federal jurisdiction precludes 
service by state authorities”); 32 C.F.R. § 720.20(a)(1) (Navy 
regulation applicable to process of state courts within the 
state in which the base is located:  “Withholding service may 
be justified only in the rare case when the individual sought 
is located in an area under exclusive Federal jurisdiction not 
subject to any reservation by the State of the right to serve 
process.”). 
exercise some degree of legislative jurisdiction.38  This 
is true for most, if not all, military installations in 
North Carolina.39  On such property, Army regulations 
require commanders first to determine whether the 
servicemember wishes to accept service. 40  If the 
servicemember declines, “the requesting party [is] 
allowed to serve the process in accordance with 
applicable state law, subject to reasonable restrictions 
imposed by the commander.”41 
Service on Navy installations proceeds in much 
the same way.  Navy and Marine Corps. regulations 
require the commanding officer’s consent for service 
on the installation but provide that “the command 
ordinarily should not prevent service of process so 
long as delivery is made in accordance with reasonable 
command regulations and is consistent with good order 
and discipline.”42  Commanders may designate a 
location for service to occur and may order 
servicemembers to that location.43  Civilians may be 
invited to the designated location and, if they refuse, 
the process server may be escorted to the civilian.44 
The procedures are different, however, if the 
military installation and the court that issued the 
process are located in different states.  In such cases, 
military policy does not require servicemembers to 
                                                          
38.  See Army Judge Advocate General Pub. AL JA 
221, Law of Military Installations:  Deskbook at 2-164 (Sept. 
1, 1996) (“Virtually all State consent or cession laws 
transferring exclusive or partial jurisdiction to the United 
States reserve a right for State authorities to serve civil and 
criminal process on the area covered.”). 
39.  See G.S. § 104-1 (authorizing United States to 
acquire land, for specified purposes and in specified 
amounts, but reserving right to serve process and to punish 
violations of N.C. criminal law occurring on land); G.S. § 
104-7 (consenting to acquisition of land for certain purposes 
subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction but reserving right to 
serve civil and criminal process of N.C. courts); State v. 
Smith, 328 N.C. 161, 168, 400 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1991) (“It 
appears that the State ceded all jurisdiction that it could 
except for the service of process [on Camp Lejeune] and this 
is what the United States accepted.”). 
40.  See 32 C.F.R. § 516.10(d)(2). 
41.  See id. 
42.  32 C.F.R. § 720.20(a)(1). 
43.  See id. 
44.  See id. (also permitting civilians to be ordered to 
leave classified areas to permit service). 
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accept service.  If the servicemember declines to 
accept service, military authorities may notify the 
process server of the refusal and deny access to the 
installation.  This appears to be true for all branches of 
the Armed Forces, with the possible exception of the 
Air Force.45 
Service by registered or certified mail. 
Because it can be difficult or time consuming to gain 
access to military facilities, plaintiffs sometimes 
attempt to serve members of the Armed Forces by 
mail.  Rule 4(j)(1)c authorizes service by “registered or 
certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to 
the party to be served and deliver[ed] to the 
addressee.”46  Proof that the summons and complaint 
were properly mailed and delivered to the addressee 
establishes proper service.47  (Note that slightly 
different requirements, discussed below, may apply to 
service by international mail on members of the Armed 
Forces stationed overseas.) 
If a servicemember refuses to accept documents 
served by mail, military or postal authorities should 
make a notation of the refusal and return the 
documents to the sender.48  Rule 4(j)(1)c requires only 
                                                          
45.  Navy and Marine Corps. regulations specifically 
allow servicemembers to refuse to accept process from out-
of-state courts.  See 32 C.F.R. § 720.20(a)(2).  Likewise, 
Army regulations permit access to Army property only when 
the state has reserved the right to serve process, in areas of 
concurrent jurisdiction, and in areas where the federal 
government has only a proprietary interest.  See 32 C.F.R. § 
516.10(d)(2).  These criteria would presumably not be 
satisfied in most cases involving process from an out-of-state 
court.  Air Force authorities may in some circumstances 
allow access to military installations for the purpose of 
serving out of state process.  See Cook, supra note 2 at 172 
n.123 (reporting that the “Air Force policy is more liberal” 
with respect to process of out-of-state courts). 
46.  G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(1)c.  Rule 4(j)(1)d also 
allows service by certain designated delivery services 
authorized pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7502(f)(2). 
47.  See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j2)(2); G.S. § 1-75.10(4), 
(5). 
48.  See 32 C.F.R. § 720.20(a)(2) (Navy regulation 
requiring notation of refusal where servicemember or civilian 
refuses to accept out-of-state process; Navy policy arguably 
requires servicemembers to accept in-state process sent by 
mail); see also United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail 
Manual F010.4.6 at 409 (updated Sept. 2, 2004) (providing 
that where addressee refuses to accept mail, document should 
be endorsed “refused” and returned). 
that a copy of the summons and complaint be delivered 
to the defendant.49  A defendant’s refusal to accept 
properly mailed documents, therefore, does not 
necessarily invalidate service, particularly if the 
defendant is aware that the documents are service 
papers.50 
Service on military installations outside the 
United States 
Plaintiffs may have more difficulty serving members 
of the Armed Forces who are stationed overseas.  The 
following sections address procedures for serving 
defendants located outside the United States and how 
these procedures are affected by military policies 
governing service of process. 
 
                                                          
49.  See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(1)c (referring to 
registered or certified mail service “by delivering to the 
addressee”); G.S. § 1-75.10(4) (requiring proof that service 
by registered or certified mail “was in fact received  as 
evidenced by the attached registry receipt or other evidence 
satisfactory to the court of delivery to the addressee”). 
50.  This bulletin does not discuss in detail whether a 
defendant who refuses to accept service is nevertheless 
subject to the jurisdiction of the court.  Some courts, 
however, deem service to be proper over a defendant who 
refuses to accept documents he or she knows to be service 
papers.  See, e.g., Miltland Raleigh-Durham v. Mudie, 122 
N.C. App. 168, 172, 468 S.E.2d 275, 277 (1996) (rejecting 
due process challenge based on alleged failure to provide 
pre-attachment notice and hearing where defendant refused 
to accept service by mail at address he had given plaintiff); 
see also Tataragasi v. Tataragasi, 124 N.C. App. 255, 263, 
477 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1996) (affirming service on defendant 
in Turkey, although plaintiff had not complied with formal 
service requirements, in part because “[t]here is also some 
evidence in the record to suggest that defendant refused to 
accept service”); Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. Ridgedale Farms, 
Civ. A. No. 87-1802, 1989 WL 12724 at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 8, 
1989) (“It is generally held that one who is informed that 
service of process is being attempted cannot avoid service by 
physically refusing to accept a summons when it is offered to 
him.”); Western Farmers Elec. Co-Op v. Stephenson, 873 
P.2d 311, 313 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994) (making same point).  
Of course, the fact that mail is returned as unclaimed (as 
opposed to refused) does not necessarily demonstrate that it 
was delivered to, and refused by, the addressee. 
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Military policies governing service outside 
the United States 
Military policies governing service of process abroad 
are generally similar to those that apply within the 
United States in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction 
where the state has not reserved the right to serve 
process.  Military authorities determine whether a 
servicemember will accept service and will convey 
documents to the servicemember if he or she agrees to 
accept them.  Absent voluntary acceptance, however, 
military authorities generally play no further role.  
Instead, they instruct the serving party to comply with 
whatever procedures are established by the law of the 
pertinent foreign country.51 
Methods of service of process abroad 
Rule 4(j3) authorizes a number of methods for 
effecting service “in a place not within the United 
States.”52  These methods apply equally to all 
defendants, regardless whether they are civilians living 
overseas in private residences or members of the 
Armed Forces residing on a military installation. 
Rule 4(j3) establishes three basic categories of 
international service mechanisms.  First, Rule 4(j3)(1) 
directs litigants to use any “internationally agreed 
means” of service, such as those authorized by the 
Hague Convention.  Second, if there is no 
internationally agreed means of service, or if the 
“applicable international agreement” allows other 
service methods, Rule 4(j3)(2) authorizes service to be 
made: 
• in a manner prescribed by the law of the 
foreign country in an action in any of its 
courts of general jurisdiction; 
• in a manner directed by the foreign authority 
in response to a letter rogatory; or 
• unless prohibited by the law of the foreign 
country, by personal delivery or any form of 
mail requiring a signed receipt, if the mail is 
addressed and dispatched by the clerk of court 
to the party to be served. 
                                                          
51.  See 32 C.F.R. 516.12(c) (Army regulation 
establishing policies for service of state court process outside 
United States); 32 C.F.R. 516.13 (listing contact information 
for those seeking assistance or information concerning 
service of process overseas); 32 C.F.R. § 720.20(a)(2) (Navy 
policies governing service of out-of-state process). 
52.  G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3). 
Finally, Rule 4(j3)(3) allows the court to order service 
by another method, provided no international 
agreement prohibits the chosen method.  In each case, 
the manner of service must be reasonably calculated to 
give notice to the defendant of the lawsuit. 
Of these service mechanisms, service pursuant to 
the Hague Convention and service by international 
mail are by far the most common.  The remainder of 
this bulletin therefore focuses briefly on those 
methods.  Readers interested in a more detailed 
treatment of these topics, and international service in 
general, should review Administration of Justice 
Bulletin No. 2004/07, International Service of Process 
Under the Hague Convention (2004).   
Service of process under the Hague 
Convention 
The Hague Convention is the primary “internationally 
agreed means” of service.  It applies in “civil and 
commercial matters”53 whenever forum law requires 
service documents to be transmitted abroad.54  
Numerous countries (“Contracting States”) have 
ratified or acceded to the Convention., including many 
of the countries in which U.S. servicemembers are 
likely to be stationed.55 
The Convention identifies several methods of 
service that may be used in Contracting States.  
Foremost among these methods is the Central 
Authority mechanism, which obliges each Contracting 
State to establish a Central Authority to receive and 
execute requests for service originating from other 
                                                          
53.  United States practice has traditionally viewed all 
non-criminal cases, including administrative proceedings, as 
“civil or commercial matters.”  See 17 I.L.M. 319 (1978) 
(report to Secretary of State by U.S. delegate to the 1977 
Special Commission); Tataragasi v. Tataragasi, 124 N.C. 
App. 255, 263, 477 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1996) (looking to 
Convention to determine validity of service in custody 
action); Warzynski v. Empire Comfort Sys., Inc., 102 N.C. 
App. 222, 401 S.E.2d 801 (1991) (product liability action). 
54.  Because the Convention applies only when 
documents are transmitted abroad, it is inapplicable if forum 
law permits service to be made in the United States (for 
example by personal service made during a servicemember’s 
visit to the state).  See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. 
Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988).  Any method of service, 
of course, must be consistent with due process.  See Mullane, 
339 U.S. at 314. 
55.  A list of these countries is attached as Table A. 
Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2004/08 December 2004 
10 
Contracting States.56  Upon receiving a request for 
service, the receiving State’s Central Authority may 
serve the documents in several ways.  First, it may 
serve the documents “by a method prescribed by [the 
receiving State’s] internal law for the service of 
documents in domestic actions upon persons who are 
within its territory.”57  Second, it may serve the 
documents by any method requested by the serving 
party and compatible with the receiving State’s law.58  
Finally, it may informally deliver the documents to a 
defendant willing to accept service.59  The receiving 
State’s Central Authority will also return to the 
applicant a certificate describing the method, time, and 
place of service and identifying the person to whom 
the document was delivered.60 
Members of the Armed Forces, like any party 
located in a Contracting State, may be served via the 
Central Authority mechanism.  This method of service, 
however, can be complex and time consuming even in 
cases involving civilians with no ties to the military.  
These problems can be compounded if service requires 
access to U.S. military installations.  For example, 
                                                          
56.  See Convention Art. 2 & 5.  
57.  See id. Art. 5(a).  For this manner of service, the 
Central Authority may require the document to be translated 
into an official language of the receiving State. 
58.  See id. Art. 5(b). 
59.  See id. Art. 5. 
60.  See Convention Art. 6 (also requiring Central 
Authority to explain why documents were not served, if 
applicable).  Other service methods identified by the 
Convention include the following: 
• In certain cases, the Convention authorizes 
consular or diplomatic officials to effect service, 
although U.S. law generally prohibits foreign 
service officers from acting in this capacity.   See 
Convention Art. 8 & 9; 22 C.F.R. § 92.85. 
• The Convention also permits certain persons in the 
originating State to effect service “directly through 
the judicial officers, officials, or other competent 
persons” of the receiving State.  Each Contracting 
State may object to this manner of service.  See 
Convention Art. 10(b), (c) & Art. 21. 
• Contracting States may also enter into separate 
agreements establishing additional service 
mechanisms, see Convention Art. 11, although the 
United States does not appear to be a party to any 
such agreements. 
depending on the Status of Forces agreement between 
the United States and the country in which the military 
installation is located, the foreign Central Authority 
may not be entitled to enter the installation.  In such 
cases, the Central Authority may attempt service 
outside the installation, but there is of course no 
guarantee that it will succeed.  Moreover, depending 
on the applicable Status of Forces agreement, some 
Central Authorities may decline to serve process 
altogether on members of the Armed Forces.61 
Because of these difficulties, many litigants 
attempt to serve members of the Armed Forces via 
international mail.  The following section briefly 
discusses the procedures governing this manner of 
service, which arguably differ somewhat from those 
applicable to cases involving litigants located in the 
United States. 
Service via international mail 
Article 10(a) of the Convention states:  “Provided the 
State of destination does not object, the present 
Convention shall not interfere with . . . the freedom to 
send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to 
persons abroad.”62  This language has provoked a 
disagreement among U.S courts.  Some have 
interpreted Article 10(a) narrowly to permit litigants to 
send documents by international mail only after 
serving process by another means.63  Others have 
rejected this narrow interpretation and held that Article 
10(a) permits service of process by international 
mail.64 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has 
approved international mail service on several 
occasions and thus appears to follow the broader 
                                                          
61.  See U.S. Dep’t of State Flyer, Service of Legal 
Documents Abroad ¶ N (Sept. 2000) 
<http://travel.state.gov/law/service_general.html> (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2004). 
62.  Convention Art. 10(a). 
63.  See, e.g., Nuovo Pignone, SpA v. STORMAN ASIA 
M/V, 310 F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir. 2002); Sardanis v. 
Sumitomo Corp., 279 A.D.2d 225, 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2001); Knapp v. Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A., 60 F. Supp. 2d 
566, 573 (S.D. W.Va. 1999). 
64.  See Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 802 (9th 
Cir. 2004); Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839-40 (2d 
Cir. 1986); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Roussel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 
460, 470-74 (D.N.J. 1998). 
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interpretation of Article 10(a).65  Servicemembers 
stationed overseas may therefore be served by mail in 
most cases.  The Convention, however, permits each 
Contracting State to object to service by “postal 
channels,”66 and a number of States have done so.67  
Service by mail will generally be improper in countries 
that have objected to Article 10(a).68 
There remains the question of what procedures 
govern mail service on a defendant located overseas.  
Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2 authorizes mail service “in a place not 
within the United States.”69  Unlike Rule 4(j)(1)c, 
however, which makes litigants responsible for mail 
service “within or without” North Carolina, Rule 
4(j3)(2)c.2 requires service by “any form of mail 
requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and 
dispatched by the clerk of court to the party to be 
served.”70  These procedures should be followed 
                                                          
65.  See Hayes v. Evergo Telephone Co., 100 N.C. App. 
474, 479, 397 S.E.2d 325, 327 (1980); Warzynski, 102 N.C. 
App. at 228, 401 S.E.2d at 805. 
66.  See Convention Art. 10 & 21. 
67.  These States include Argentina, Bulgaria, China, 
Czech Republic, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Republic of San 
Marino, Republic of South Korea, Slovak Republic, Sri 
Lanka, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela.  See 
Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2004/07, International 
Service of Process Under the Hague Convention (2004).   
68.  See, e.g., Shenouda v. Mehanna, 203 F.R.D. 166, 
171 (D.N.J. 2001); Davies v. Jobs & Adverts Online, Gmbh, 
94 F. Supp. 2d  719, 721 n.6 (E.D. Va. 2000); Lyman Steel 
Corp. v. Ferrostaal Metals Corp., 747 F. Supp. 389, 399-400 
(N.D. Ohio 1990); Dr. Ing. H.C.F. Porsche A.G. v. Superior 
Court, 123 Cal.App.3d 755, 761-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).  
But see Tataragasi v. Tataragasi, 124 N.C. App. 255, 264, 
477 S.E.2d 239, 244 (1996) (apparently upholding service by 
mail in Turkey, which has objected to Article 10(a), but 
limiting its holding to child custody cases in which the 
defendant has actual notice of the action and the plaintiff 
attempts in good faith to comply with the Convention). 
69.  See G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3) (first paragraph). 
70.  G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2 (emphasis added).  
Presumably, Rule 4(j)(1)c does not authorize international 
mail service in a manner inconsistent with the more specific 
provisions contained in Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.  Cf. Fowler v. 
Valencourt, 334 N.C. 345, 349, 435 S.E.2d 530, 532 (1993) 
(“Where one of two statutes might apply to the same 
situation, the statute which deals more directly and 
specifically with the situation controls over the statute of 
whenever the defendant is located in a country that has 
not ratified or acceded to the Hague Convention.71 
If the defendant is located in a Contracting State, 
however, there is an argument that mail service may 
take any form that satisfies due process.  A detailed 
treatment of this argument is beyond the scope of this 
bulletin, but interested readers should refer to 
Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2004/07, 
International Service of Process Under the Hague 
Convention (2004).  The validity of this argument is 
questionable, and, until the appellate courts provide 
definitive guidance, a litigant who wishes to use the 
mails to serve a party located in a Contracting State 
would be prudent to comply with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.72 
In most cases, litigants should be able to prove 
that service documents were delivered to the 
defendant.  The Department of Defense operates 
Military Post Offices (MPOs) for military personnel 
overseas or on ships where the U.S. Postal Service 
does not operate.73  Military policy appears to require 
MPO personnel to obtain the addressee’s signature 
                                                                                         
more general applicability.”).  Note, too, that Rule 4(j3) 
requires proof of service by mail to include “an affidavit or 
certificate of addressing and mailing by the clerk of court.” 
71.  Rule 4(j3)(3) permits the court to order service by 
any method “not prohibited by international agreement.”  
This rule presumably authorizes the court to order service by 
mail in a manner that does not comply with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.  
See, e.g., Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 805-06; Levin v. Rush 
Trading Co., 248 F. Supp. 537, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
72.  The few North Carolina cases addressing 
international mail service in Contracting States do not make 
clear whether litigants must comply with Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2.  
Compare Warzynski 102 N.C. App. at 228, 401 S.E.2d at 805 
(evaluating service made under Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2) and Hocke 
v. Hanyane, 118 N.C. App. 630, 632-34, 456 S.E.2d 858, 
859-60 (1995) (same) with Hayes, 100 N.C. App. at 476, 397 
S.E.2d at 327 (approving mail service as conforming to 
Convention even though plaintiff, rather than clerk, 
apparently mailed service papers).  Proof of service under 
Rule 4(j3) must include an affidavit or certificate of mailing 
from the clerk of court, which arguably suggests that the 
procedures of Rule 4(j3)(2)c.2 are mandatory in all cases.    
73.  See U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Dir. 4525.6-M, 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSTAL MANUAL at 17 (Aug. 15, 
2002).  Servicemembers in the Army or Air Force have 
Army Post Office (APO) addresses, and members of the 
Coast Guard, Navy, and Marine Corps. have Fleet Post 
Office (FPO) addresses.  See id.    
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prior to delivering mail for which a return receipt has 
been requested and to “return the receipt(s) promptly 
to the source.”74  If a servicemember refuses to accept 
certified or registered mail, MPO personnel should 
endorse the document “refused” and return it to the 
sender.75 
Conclusion 
Members of the Armed Forces, and civilians living or 
working on military installations, are subject to the 
same rules governing service of process as any other 
litigant.  Military policy and the extent of federal 
control over military bases, however, affects the 


















                                                          
74.  Id. ¶ C3.2.7.1.10, at 73. 
75.  See id. ¶ C3.2.5.8.1, at 71. 
On some occasions, substituted personal service at the 
servicemember’s former civilian residence may be 
appropriate.  More often, a plaintiff will have to resort 
to personal service on military property.  This manner 
of service is often feasible if the court and the military 
installation are located in the same state.  The plaintiff 
may also use an appropriate form of mail service, 
whether the servicemember is stationed in the U.S. or 
abroad.  If a defendant is stationed abroad in a country 
that does not permit service by mail, however, the 
plaintiff may be required to use the Central Authority 
mechanism established by the Hague Convention.76  In 
each case, of course, the manner of service must be 
reasonably calculated to inform the defendant of the 
existence and nature of the action.    
                                                          
76.  Other provisions of Rule 4(j3) may also authorize 
service, such as Rule 4(j3)(3), which permits the Court to 
order alternative service methods.  Again, readers interested 
in a fuller treatment of international service should review 
Administration of Justice Bulletin No. 2004/07, International 
Service of Process Under the Hague Convention (2004).  
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Table A 
States that have ratified or acceded to the Hague Convention77 
 
•   Anguilla 
•   Antigua and Barbuda 
•   Argentina 
•   Aruba 
•   Bahamas 
•   Barbados 
•   Belarus 
•   Belgium 
•   Belize† 
•   Bermuda 
•   Botswana 
•   British Virgin Islands 
•   Bulgaria 
•   Canada 
•   Cayman Islands 
•   China 
•   Cyprus 
•   Czech Republic 
•   Denmark 
•   Djibouti (formerly Afars 
and Issas)† 
•   Egypt 
•   Estonia 
•   Falklands Islands 
•   Fiji† 
•   Finland 
•   France (incl. French 
Overseas Depts.) 
 
•   French Polynesia† 
•   Germany 
•   Gibraltar† 
•   Greece 
•   Guernsey 
•   Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region 
•   Hungary‡ 
•   Ireland 
•   Isle of Man 
•   Israel 
•   Italy 
•   Japan 
•   Jersey 
•   Korea, Republic of (South Korea)  
•   Kuwait 
•   Kiribati (formerly Gilbert Islands and 
Central and Southern Line Islands) † 
•   Latvia 
•   Lithuania 
•   Luxembourg 
•   Macau Special Administrative Region 
•   Malawi 
•   Mexico 
•   Montserrat 
•   Netherlands 
•   Nevis† 
•   Norway 
•   Pakistan 
•   Pitcairn 
•   Poland 
•   Portugal 
•   Romania‡ 
•   Russian Federation 
•   St. Christopher (Kitts) 
•   St. Helena and Dependencies 
•   St. Lucia 
•   St. Vincent and the Grenadines† 
•   San Marino 
•   Seychelles 
•   Slovak Republic 
•   Slovenia 
•   Solomon Islands† 
•   Spain 
•   Sri Lanka 
•   Sweden 
•   Switzerland 
•   Turkey 
•   Turks and Caicos Islands 
•   Tuvalu (formerly Ellice Islands) † 
•   Ukraine 
•   United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland 
•   United States (incl. Guam, Puerto 
Rico, and the Virgin Islands) 
•   Venezuela 
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77.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, accompanying materials (listing parties to Convention and declarations of Contracting States). 
†  See U.S. Dep’t of State flyer, Hague Convention on the Serv. Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil 
and Comm. Matters <http://travel.state.gov/law/hague_service.html> (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).  The list assumes the 
Convention remains in force in countries that have achieved independence after it was extended to them, including Belize, 
Djibouti, Fiji, Kiribati, Nevis, St. Christopher, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu.  See id. 
‡  See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Status Table:  Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service 
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters <http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act= 
conventions.status&cid=17#nonmem> (last visited Nov. 30, 2004) (noting recent accession of Hungary and Romania; 
Convention enters into force in Hungary April 1, 2005). 
